

Ensuring Election Integrity for Tennessee Voters

IBM ESSEE WOTERS

WE ARE A CITIZENS GROUP.

- Expertse in IT into systems, date systems, auching and processes.
 Parallel group to those pursing an audit support each other.
 Outressech requireds (but not inmed tit)
 Internal (localistate systems).
 National (states and finish tarks).
 National (states and finish tarks).
 Manuals, counts poll workers legislators committeed/commissis.
 Consumeralchzens, open meetings.

TENNESS EE VOTERS

OUR CONCLUSION: COMPROMISED SECURITY ISSUES EXIST.

- Electronic vortica assistans

 Sistem standardick weaker born first simulphone (2005 vs. 2021)

 Santawada not being enforced by enfolse, charged with cooping of Vendors (not cazaris) control the process ballottabulation/post-election
- Front-door vulnerabilities
 Vitier rolls and voling centers
 Poll walchers/workers critical component, organization, training weak
 Poll walchers/workers critical component, organization, training weak
- Back-door vulnerabilities
 Tabulating, vendor system control, post-election reporting, auditing
 State transling to more electronic machines with vendor control.

OI OI Comprehensive Voting Model Recommendations The contract of the contract o

County/State votar <u>distaloses in constant flux – politifially during veting periods – can les an estaloles disettenes</u>

County may be liste impovered to help maintain votar rolls vis state-level tools.

High catan mobility = high frequency of move implicativation county.

PROBLEM: FRONT DOOR
VOTER ROLL DATA INTEGRITY, MANAGEMENT ARE CONCERNING.
Data is the most valuable commodity

County Votes Reg ID numbers predictably assigned can be reassigned • Downstream functional and security concerns

IENNESSEE VOIERS

FOR ELECTION MEETINGS

SO WHAT IS NEEDED...

Indementation of a <u>MORIA model that surports</u>

Admentation of the <u>Noter</u> votor Rolls.

Admentation of the <u>Railor</u> Ensure note is secure, counted as cast.

Admentation of the <u>Count</u> Audit the tabulation

Dominate foremone(sy) put voter closer to hather voto.

Transparent process



- SOLUTION: FRONT DOOR

 MORE AGGRESSIVE WITH VOTER ROLL INTEGRITY.

 CONTRAL ISSES ROOM spalem. State review of TN Dept of Safety address records, Princetwee behavy resources.

 Brownstate.
- Recommended Leoders

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
 Ensure County-level access to move maniferance resources such as:

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 Existing 9 ISCS 1978(c) anvitor move access to TA Dopt Safety,

 Social Security Interview Instance Leoners, It is a Volume Interview Instance Security Instance County-Instance Coun





- SOLUTION: FRONT DOOR

 MORE AGGRESSIVE WITH <u>YOTER ROLL INTEGRITY</u>.

 Envared review of overall lover fregionation software and poccess

 Retainst assisting Sales Celeforation processes to nevel for introducintly that environs data integrity, proactive monitoring vic. AND recommend additional stinidation, assisted.

 Data logic checked as a SOCPs to effect monital and that a final better hand plant present verposeder roll cleanup.

 Ensure Rebusit Election and List Maintenance Addition.

 Paper and electronic artifacts for 22 months.





- PROBLEM: FRONT DOOR

 "CONVENIENT" VOTING CENTERS ARE AN OPENING FOR FRAUD.

 Require internet connectionly which can be exploited by malkings senses.

 Loss control of volatible protections of the ability to more suicidly identify discreptions or data control.

 discreptions or data control.

 Securely and VPN dis., pit sit vulnerable.

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 Even high-oblier orgs are headed constationly.

 (Tillodia, Facebook, Marrett, Coloural Poplinia, USS, Vihoo, DoDIOPM).

 Obtamin have voiced desire for SECURITY over CONVENIENCE of violing centers.







Voting Centers
 Rely on Ballot Marking Devices (BMDa) (unneeded sech)
 Rel cold (wedo-heavy, complicated, not transparent
 Return to greezing-based verting wheth
 Authenticates the voter with paper check-in
 Reduces restorce on the internet committing and technology.
 Emmittee possible activity of bad actors.




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SOLUTION: FRONT DOOR
ELIMINATE VOTING CENTERS.

PROBLEM: WITHOUT HAND-MARKED PAPER BALLOTS, VENDORS CONTROL THE PROCESS.


· Ballot is





















PROBLEN: BACK DOOR PER MANUAL: RESULTS TALLY & REPORTING (RTR) SYSTEM

- Can allow mass vote changing downstream.
 Can delete results and substitute with data from local source.
 No dual-party authentication required.

- Inferring an indirect connection to the internet.
 Remote thents can communicate with server via Dominion. Reports can be published to "Public" transfer points:

- Agan intering a nework connection.
 No clarification from vande: TN Coordinator of Elections
 VICEC Elections Office has varied.

TENN ESSEE VOTERS

PROBLEM: BACK DOOR WEAK AUDIT.

- Raudis 13 of the process in less than 13 of the countes in Tennessee.
 Yields false election configence. Should be and-to-end.
 What is an end-to-end audit? Three signients.
 Viole infantion voite cast. Ballot san code represent voter's vote?
 Viole cast. voite count. Tabulator correctly record, count the ballot?
 Viole caunt voite tally. Report system correctly tally labulator votes?
 Only 13 of Tennessee countee?
 Only 28 countes produce paper ballots able to be audited.



SOLUTION: BACK DOOR AN ENHANCED RISK LIMITING AUDIT.

- Mandatory, post-election ballot poling risk limiting audit of paper balos to substantiate the machine count and welly that the winner won
 Statistical random sampla, hand-counted, end-2-end, Unique trandomized number on ballot supports the audit.
 901% confidence with few hand-counted ballots in small.
- Update in process



- SOLUTION: BACK DOOR

 OPERATIONAL AUDIT.

 Evaluates the performance of election commission operations statewide.

 Checks compliance on various responsibilities, laws, security ssuper.

 20% of Innespect counties audited annually over five-year period.

 Independent auditor.

- Together, both audits address all recommendations from the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS)





IN SUMMARY

TENNESSEE VOTERS

WHAT CITIZENS WANT IN THIS ELECTION INTEGRITY MODEL.

- More secure, comprehensive voting model with less technology:
 Mozer rolls. Protect from more
 Present zolls. Protect from more
 Present zolls. Protect from more
 Pagest ballots. Handmarker, random ID, watermarked no BMCarCREs.
 Oblical scanners. Reading nand marks no IOR codes.
 Ballet Polling Risk Limiting Audit Post-deveton, end-2-end validation of the efections: lost count. to affirm the winner.
 Operational Audit. Annual state audit of dourity election commissions.
 Unreleating othin of custody. Ballots/precent/scountyletate totals.
 Phylical accountability.

Security Risk Evaluation of machines vs. simple recertification.



ENMESSEE VOTTES

- WHAT YOU CAN DO.

 Build registronizes with local electron commission and state consistenators.

 Write, call amail, let them know your concorns.

Every voter wants to know that their vote counled
 That the election was fair and honest and
 That the results trut (soziolegis)s the will of the posotio, whatever that may ha

WHY ITS WANTED BY CITIZENS.

There are <u>holes in our system</u> preventing the clear outcome femnessee needs to close those holes to tetter ensure election integrity.

- State the passes
 Advocate or <u>study of voter rell integrity</u> <u>hand-marked poper hallot</u>
 vendor, separates from tabulation vendor, selminate voting arrivers &
 ventru to premier voting, implement vote and record budgs, aroners
 july, ventru,

- Let them know <u>Accuracy is more important than convenience</u>
 <u>Get implying</u> Poli worker, pal watcher, prepare than
 <u>Go to meetings</u> Learn voling systems read past minutes, volce concerns

