DELINQUENT DOCUMENTS FROM MULTIPLE OPEN RECORDS REQUESTS
OCTOBER 26, 2021 FRANKLIN ALDERMAN ELECTION

Results Tally & Reporting system

- August 10, 2021 letters to Bob Brown about questions to ask Dominion.
- August 10, 2021 letter to Mark Goins requesting he get questions to vendors after they snubbed us.
- September 28, 2021 confirmed by our machine inspection and Evelyn Walker as affirmative
- October 11, 2021 presentation to the State Election Commission – didn't they ask you about it?
- December 6, 2021 open records request to Williamson County Election Commission
- December 6, 2021 open records request to Tre Hargett; January 15, 2022 follow up
- February 6, 2022 follow up to Hargett general counsel Michael Harmon
- January 18, 2022 response back to Robert Cook explaining our December 6, 2021 request

After reviewing the most recent version of the User's Manual Ver. 5.5.139 for the Dominion RTR (Results Tally and Reporting) Module, a copy sent to us by WCEC Elections Administrator Chad Gray, we still see the concerns expressed when reviewing the earlier version of the manual months ago and expressed in our presentations. We believe this opens opportunities for nefarious actions on the part of bad actors if not addressed immediately.

The following features are documented in the Dominion Result Tally and Reporting (RTR) system. Section and Figure references are from the Dominion RTR User Manual Ver. 5.5.139.

- The RTR system allows for mass changing of votes by deleting results entered (Section 9.3 & 9.4) from secure removable media cards (results physically transported from precinct scanners) and replacing them with data from a local file (Section 7.4) or NAS (indicating some form of network is supported) attached files (Section 7.5) or by manual entry (Section 9.2). No dual-party authentication or oversight of the operator is required to perform these actions. A log entry is made, but we have confirmed at least in our county that this log file is not audited as part of the election certification.
- The RTR can publish reports to "Public" transfer points (Figure 65, Section 13.3), both "Local and Global" apparently including FTP sites (Figure 66), inferring that at least an indirect connection to the internet is supported.
- In addition, "RTR has exposed services through which remote clients can communicate with the server…" (Section 14.4). Also inferring a network connection beyond the local area network is possible. These client connections are logged in the RTM logs. If this log is not being audited prior to election certification, it should be.
- As a retired Fortune 500 CIO with years of experience in application development and security, the capabilities above in a desktop application used to tally voting results seem exceptionally risky and don't affirm a devotion to election integrity. If, in fact, a system that can make mass changes to consolidated votes is in any way attached to the internet or can be remotely accessed, this appears to be a critical flaw in the system design and integrity. Even notwithstanding the network access, we have confirmed that in Williamson County, a single trusted individual has the ability to make massive vote changes locally in the RTR with no dual-party oversight or 3rd party witness. We believe that nothing short of a ballot polling RLA would have caught such an action with the current practices.

Chain of custody for scanner tub at audit without a seal tag

- December 6, 2021 Public records request.
- January 18, 2022 response back to Robert Cook explaining our December 6th request.
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During the October 27th audit that followed the October 26th election, one of the Dominion scanner bins (we believe it was from early voting or absentee voting) lined up next to the eastern wall at the Williamson County Ag Center where the audit was to be held did not have a security tag. It is identified in the photo below by the red box below the bin.

We need to see the chain of custody document that proves there was a tag on that scanner bin at that time, which would have been 1 p.m. on October 27, 2021.

TCA statement on retention of both paper AND electronic election artifacts
- December 6, 2021 Public records request.
- January 18, 2022 response back to Robert Cook explaining our December 6th request.
- December 6, 2021 open records request to Tre Hargett; January 15, 2022 follow up.
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Finally, we asked this TCA-related question of WCEC Elections Administrator Chad Gray last September 28, 2021 and have yet to receive an answer. We've asked it again in our open records request of WCEC and the Secretary of State because it seems no one will give us an answer. (Seems to me the easiest thing to do would be for you to turn to someone on your staff to develop a ruling on this question.) One more time, if we can't ask questions of our election officials and get answers, to whom can we turn? Here's the needed ruling:
- As we understand TCA 2-8-108, all local election artifacts are to be kept for six months and federal election artifacts kept for 22 months. But during our September 28, 2021 inspection of Williamson County election machines on behalf of four Alderman candidates, the Election Administrator said that he was unsure if the statue meant that BOTH paper and electronic election artifacts are to be retained. He affirmed they kept paper artifacts but not electronic artifacts, which seems to contradict the law. Since DREs are completely electronic I would assume that this law would cover those electronic artifacts as "artifacts" and they need to be retained as if they were paper. So, this law should mean that all election commissions in Tennessee should be saving BOTH paper and electronic artifacts.
- We need to see documentation or an interpretation of the law that better delineates if electronic artifacts are to be kept just as paper artifacts are to be kept per the law. And what those electronic artifacts might include. We would assume that means everything down to occasional snapshots of the internal settings and data that has been run on each machine throughout the full system, precinct and back-office machinery.

Additional issues needing to be addressed from our email to Bob Brown & Chad Gray March 10, 2021
- Will be submitted separately.