



## PERFORM A SECURITY RISK EVALUATION TO ENSURE ALL VOTING MACHINES AND MACHINE BRANDS USED IN TENNESSEE ARE SAFE AND TRUSTWORTHY

Voting machines have been proven to be hackable. Even with security steps in place. For proof of this, just check [here](#),<sup>1</sup> [here](#),<sup>2</sup> [here](#)<sup>3</sup> and [here](#).<sup>4</sup> Or look to the many national and international companies that spend billions on data security, only to have their systems hacked and confidential customer data stolen every year.

With votes and ballots the currency of our elections, it is imperative that any equipment used in voting should be thoroughly inspected before purchase and before/after any election to protect the election. And ensure our voting currency is secure and the results of an election fair and dependable.

We have long advocated that instead of a simple recertification process -- [which the Tennessee State Election Commission promised to do on April 5, 2021 and have yet to perform](#)<sup>5</sup> – voting machines need to be more rigorously inspected and certified. Since we feel [the Election Assistance Commission \(EAC\) and their Voting System Testing Labs \(VSTL\) have proven to be highly weak in this process](#),<sup>6</sup> we believe that all five brands currently approved for use in Tennessee counties need to be audited via a **Security Risk Evaluation**. And with no other national standard currently available, this should be done against the [EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines \(VMSG\) 2.0](#)<sup>7</sup> (minus the fact, of course, that [the EAC in 2021 allowed vendors to insert wireless connectivity into machines](#)).<sup>8</sup>

There should absolutely be no wireless anywhere in any voting system.

However, none of the brands used in Tennessee – in fact, no brand on the market today – has been certified to those standards. Even worse, none have been certified past the 2005 standards. And think of this... the first smart phone was launched in 2007. Yet we vote on equipment that is certified only to 2005 standards... standards that were in place 17 years ago. Two years before the iPhone was introduced.

Since the EAC won't demand brands immediately match 22 standards, and state election commissions aren't requiring it as well, Tennessee should take the lead in security and establish its own Minimum Voting Standards Guidelines (MVSG) based on those sections of the VMSG 2.0 that we feel are necessary

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<sup>1</sup> <https://rumble.com/vtacuu-halderman-tells-congress-voting-machines-can-be-hacked-anywhere-anytime-by-.html>

<sup>2</sup> <https://rumble.com/vtah4d-congressional-members-testify-voting-machines-can-change-votes.html>

<sup>3</sup> <https://rumble.com/vtag3o-voting-machines-can-be-infected-with-malware-to-change-votes.html>

<sup>4</sup> <https://tennesseeelectionintegrity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Election-machines-can-be-hacked-012522.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> [https://sos-tn-gov-files.tnsosfiles.com/20210405\\_SECMinutes.pdf](https://sos-tn-gov-files.tnsosfiles.com/20210405_SECMinutes.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> <https://tennesseeelectionintegrity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/EAC-is-untrustworthy-012522.pdf>

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[https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eac.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocument\\_library%2Ffiles%2FVoluntary\\_Voting\\_System\\_Guidelines\\_Versio\\_2\\_012921.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK](https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eac.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocument_library%2Ffiles%2FVoluntary_Voting_System_Guidelines_Versio_2_012921.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK)

<sup>8</sup> <https://freespeechforpeople.org/u-s-election-assistance-commission-sued-for-improperly-loosening-voting-system-standards-after-private-meetings-with-voting-machine-manufacturers/>

to ensure election integrity. Forcing vendors to do this will guarantee far more secure elections in our state.

Here's how a Security Risk Evaluation should be performed.

1. The Tennessee State Election Commission (SEC) should decide on any essentials that they will require in the voting process. We suggest:
  - Hand-marked paper ballots with ID numbers and other high security safeguards.
  - No encryption of voter selections (No QR codes or Bar codes).
  - Protection from counterfeit ballots.
  - Protection from ballots being counted twice.
  - Protection against any form of network (internet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, modem, etc.) connectivity beyond necessary "whitelisted" election devices.
  - Protection against unauthorized hardware and software being utilized in the election process by way of software and hardware verifications before and after every election.
2. The SEC would fund a team consisting of six bi-partisan IT, cybersecurity, internal controls and auditing experts who would evaluate Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 and create a subset of criteria – a Minimum Voting Standards Guideline (MVSG) -- that are critical to ensuring a secure and accurate election.
3. The team should add to those criteria the requirements of the SEC above, if necessary.
4. In addition to existing machines brands in Tennessee, the team should research and identify any alternative vendors that they propose should be considered for certification.
5. The criteria and proposed vendor candidates should be reviewed, modified as appropriate and approved by the SEC.
6. These criteria should then be sent to each of the vendors being considered for certification, or re-certification, for them to self-analyze and provide a report back within one month as to whether they:
  - 1-fully meet;
  - 2-partially meet; or
  - 3- do not meet each criterion.

They should describe with photo evidence any pertinent details and any compensating features of their systems that may address the concerns of unmet criteria. Vendors should also describe, again, with photo evidence, any particular features they offer above and beyond the criteria which they feel are beneficial.
7. The team should then do an audit on each vendor of their responses focusing on a few of the most important criteria and anywhere they have reason to believe the vendor may be weaker than reported.

8. After winnowing down the number of candidates, it would be ideal for the team to then inspect the machines deemed appropriate for approval to operate in Tennessee. Voting systems with open-source code will be given preferential consideration since the state and every county user should be allowed to “look under the hood” before they buy or continue use of the machines to ensure machines are clean of technology that could be nefariously used by rogue entities.
9. The team would then make a recommendation to the SEC of their findings ranking the vendors quality, stating which vendors they feel are adequate to be certified and providing the most critical pros and cons that were identified in the process including the following when pertinent:
  - Prioritize risks, determine the likelihood and impact
  - Document vendors’ ability/plans to remediate risks
  - Identify any vendor plans to remediate that are critical to the vendors certification
10. The SEC would then evaluate in the presence of citizens the recommendations and data provided by the team and make a decision via roll call on which and how many systems would be certified. There should be no requirement of 5 options if there are not 5 viable vendors.
11. The Secretary of State and Tennessee’s Election Coordinator should then issue and post on the Secretary of State’s website a news release announcing the final approved brands of voting machines that will be available to Tennessee counties. They will back up the decision with:
  - A discussion of the process;
  - The performance of each brand that was considered;
  - Why they did or did not make the final approved list of brands; and
  - Showing the roll call votes.
12. This process could then be tailored by each county for inspection of the machines by a county-based inspection team prior to any election. If this occurs, we would recommend the county election commission posting results of each inspection on its election website.

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