HOW PRECINCT VOTING CAN BE SAFELY AND EASILY ACHIEVED
WITH NO BALLOT MARKING DEVICES OR ANY INTERNET CONNECTIONS

In a Spring Hill, Tennessee municipal election on April 13, 2023, the Maury County Election Commission structured their precincts as a test to remove all internet connections coming into the precinct (they do not vote in vote centers but they use electronic poll books which require an internet connection to the election office), to return voter registration to paper registration (instead of electronic poll book registration), and to remove all ballot marking devices. Three points of concern in the voting process that have been proven to allow nefarious actors an avenue for hacking into an election and the ability to change results. The following details what they did in this small election to test what appears to be a highly successful trial.

The changes in the precinct
- Two weeks prior to the election, the voting rolls are closed and printed off by precinct onto 8-1/2x11" paper.
- The precinct copies are divided into 4-5 alpha sections and placed into three-ring binders for registrar use.
- Electronic poll books and ballot marking devices are removed. One tabulator is needed per precinct.
- Sequentially numbered hand-marked paper ballots are printed, counted & divided by precincts.   Ballot numbers are at bottom of ballot and below tear-off perforation.
- One worker is the distributor of the numbered hand marked paper ballots. He/she notes the numbered range and total number of blank ballots at the beginning of the voting day.
- If disabled voter requires help (few do), the poll official will assist him/her on hand-marked paper ballot.

The voting process
- Before the election begins, tabulator worker marks down the public and protected counts from the tabulator.
- The voter enters precinct and fills out registration sheet. Walks it to the alpha order registrar table.
- The registrar looks up voter info in binder, verifies registration, approval to vote, voter signs voter roll.
- The registrar signs the voter's registration sheet.
- The voter takes the registration sheet to the ballot table and receives the ballot.
- Ballot handler marks the ballot number on registration sheet and signs both sheet and ballot near number that will be torn off. Voter takes both registration sheet and ballot to privacy ballot marking booth and marks the bubbles of his/her election choices.
- The voter takes the ballot and registration sheet to the tabulator where the worker tears off the ballot number at perforation and gives the ballot back to voter. The voter gives the registration sheet to the tabulator worker and then inserts his ballot into the tabulator where it is counted. He/she leaves the precinct.
- Tabulator worker staples the torn ballot number stub to the registration sheet and stores both as one document in a 3-ring binder near tabulator.

Verification of all precinct numbers at the end of the voting day (both EV and ED) – a four-legged stool
- Registrars twice count the number of voters that signed the voter roll in the binders.
- Ballot handler counts # of used ballots by subtracting remaining ballot number from beginning ballot total.
- Tabulator worker twice counts number of registration sheets with stapled ballot stubs.
- Those numbers, which should be the same, are compared to the public and protected counts on the tabulator machine, which should, likewise, sync with the other numbers.   All these numbers documented on poll forms.
- If any number is off, then all three are recounted and compared. If they continue to be off, then the poll official must notify the election officials of the discrepancy.
- All of this is documented by chain of custody documentation forms.

This election experiment successfully verified that this process is possible and safely adds more security verification steps into the election precinct verification process.